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INTRODUCTION 1
The Debtor seeks to have this Court ignore the facts of the case and the plain
language of the exemption statute, and instead make its ruling on inapplicable
hypothetical situations, unsupported policy arguments, and a reliance on a fictitious
"status quo". The Debtor fails to point to any relevant facts or case law that supports her
assertion that she is entitled to claim an exemption in the Property Settlement. Instead,

~

the Debtor argues that the legal classification of her interest in the Property Settlement is
unimportant, and "purely academic." The Debtor then ignores the plain language of the

Gk)

exemption statute, arguing simply that it should apply based solely on a "status quo" that
amounts merely to a misunderstanding of the law. The Debtor cautions that failing to
accept her arguments will result in a potential parade of horribles, including creditors
"helicoptering" divorce proceedings, a 45 (or 55) year old woman, with 4 (or 7)
children,2 becoming a "public charge," and will result in a "cataclysmic" change to the
"current status of divorce, debtor/creditor, and bankruptcy jurisprudence."
The Debtor's broad, sweeping allegations and half-truths are misleading and

ii

inapplicable to the facts of this case. The Debtor, and not the Trustee, made the decision
to file a petition for bankruptcy relief. The Debtor, and not the Trustee, determined the
r;;,,

~

1

2

Capitalized terms not defined herein are given the meaning ascribed in the Trustee's
Appellant's Brief.
See Opening Brief ofDeborah Kiley (the "Debtor's Brief"), 16 ("Otherwise, the 45year-old homemaker of four children .. .loses the protection for those accounts upon
divorce"); but see id., 22 ("the 55 year old homemaker of 7 has no protections from
") .
.
ered1tors...
1
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timing of the Debtor's bankruptcy petition. The Debtor, and not the Trustee, made the
~

deliberate, strategic decision to file her petition for bankruptcy relief, seeking to
discharge approximately $40,000.00 of debt (which consisted primarily oflegal fees from

<,

the Debtor's divorce proceeding), one day after entering into the Property Settlement
which entitled her to receive more than $220,000.00. No matter how ill-advised the
Debtor's decision may have been, it was the Debtor's decision. No hypothetical situation
can supersede the facts of this particular case, and no regrettable decision by the Debtor
can alter the plain meaning of the exemption statutes. The Debtor's interest in the

~

Property Settlement on the Petition Date is non-exempt property of the Debtor's
bankruptcy estate.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ON
THE PETITION DATE DETERMINES THE APPLICABILITY OF
EXEMPTIONS
The Debtor asserts that any interest she held in the Property Settlement is exempt, 3

<J,

whether vested, contingent, or equitable, regardless of when such interest was obtained. 4

3

4

The Debtor argues both that she had no interest in the 401 (k) until the entry of a
divorce decree, and that she held an equitable interest in the 401(k) at its accrual. See
Debtor's Brief, n.2, n.8 ("until a divorce decree is entered one spouse does not have
ownership to property titled in the other spouse"); but see id. at 19 ("regardless of
who the owner of record is, both parties share an interest in marital property"); Id. at
20 ("[t]he Notice of Interest did not create a right-in fact it cannot, but only asserted
one that already existed."), Id. at 21 ("[s]he owned it when it was accruing-not when
she filed for divorce, not when the QDRO was executed by the state court etc.").
See id. at 15 ("a spouse who is or will be owed money from an ERISA qualified
account may claim both the exemption found in Utah Code Ann.§ 788-5505(l)(a)(xv) as an alternate payee, and is also an "individual" under the Act who
may assert Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xiv) to shield his or her own
2
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~

This is simply not true. As previously explained by the Trustee in her opening brief, the
Petition Date determines both property of the bankruptcy estate and the Debtor's

~

exemptions in property. 5 Thus, the Debtor is entitled to an exemption in the Property
Settlement only to the extent that it qualified for one of the specific, enumerated
exemptions on the Petition Date. On the Petition Date the Debtor did not hold a direct
interest in the 40l(k), was not an alternate payee, and did not have an interest in property
payable to an alternate payee. Instead, the Debtor held an equitable interest in marital
property, and a contractual right to payment under the Property Settlement. A contractual
right to payment is not the same as a direct interest in a 40 I (k). 6
The Debtor cannot change the legal characteristics of her interest in the Property
Settlement merely by calling it an interest in a retirement account. 7 The Property
Settlement is not an interest subject to exemption under either subsection (xiv) or
subsection (xv) of Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(l)(a).

5
6

7

ownership in½ of the spouse's ERISA qualified account. And, this may be done
regardless of whether a divorce proceeding is pending or QDRO status."); Id. at 19
("[t]he nature of that interest (i.e. equitable, contingent, vested etc.) is academic").
11 U.S.C. § 541; see also Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 314, n.6 (1991).
See In re Expert Tulsa, 522 B.R. 634, 648-49 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that escrowed
funds were not property of the estate, but that the estate owned the right to assert a
claim against the escrow agent to enforce its contractual rights under the escrow
agreement); Scott v. King (In re Amerson), 839 F.3d 1290, 1300 (10th Cir. 2016) (a
cause of action is a separate interest from the underlying legal instrument that it seeks
to invoke).
See In re Christensen, 561 B.R. 195,215 (Bankr. Utah 2016) ("The fact that parties
agree to call an apple an orange does not mean that a court must adjudicate that it is
an orange."); see also In re Romero, 533 B.R. 807,816 (Bankr. Colo. 2015)
(declining to extend a homestead exemption to include the debtor's interest in a
Peterbilt Truck, even though the debtor used it as his home).
3
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iii

II.

THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS NOT EXEMPT UNDER THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE EXEMPTION STATUTES

The Debtor asserts that the Trustee's reliance on the plain language of the statutes
is "absurd", 8 "offensive,"9 and "insane." 10 The Debtor further asserts that, regardless of
{fl

the nature of the Debtor's interest in the Property Settlement, the Court must liberally
construe the exemption statutes to allow the Debtor an exemption "lest she become a
public charge." 11
Although ambiguities in the exemption statutes are liberally construed in favor of
the Debtor, 12 absent such ambiguity the statute must be construed according to its plain
language. 13 "It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory interpretation,

8
9

10
11
12

13

~

Debtor's Brief, 13.
Debtor's Brief, 13, 22.
Debtor's Brief, 16.
Debtor's Brief, 2, 22.
Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 167 (Utah 1996)
(Durham, J., dissenting) ("when we find ambiguity in a statute's plain language, we
seek guidance from legislative history and relevant policy considerations"); See, e.g.,
Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Utah
1997) (noting that ambiguities in tax imposition statutes are construed "liberally in
favor of the taxpayer") (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117
Utah 348, 215 P .2d 626, 627-28 (Utah 1950) (holding that all ambiguities in statutes
granting the power of eminent domain must be construed strictly against the
condemning party); Gladwell v. Reinhart (In re Reinhart), 2011 UT 77, iJ 10,267
P.3d 895 ("In addition, we construe exemption statutes liberally ... in favor of the
debtor to protect him.and his family from hardship." (quoting In re Kunz, 2004 UT
71, iJ 8, 99 P.3d 793).
State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, iJ 12,240 P.3d 780 (When the "meaning of [a] statute
can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed.") (quoting
LP/ Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, iJ 11,215 P.3d 135) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Nelson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) ("When
language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no
room is left for construction.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
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[the Court's] primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature," and
"[t]he best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself." 14
The Court cannot override the unambiguous text of the statute with arguments about
"purpose." 15 When the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be
held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction. 16
Here, the statute is unambiguous. Subsection (xiv) specifically excludes an
interest of an alternate payee in a retirement account, evincing the legislature's intent to
exclude such an interest from the statutory exemptions. 17 Indeed, in 1999 the legislature
amended and expanded the homestead exemption to include "an equitable interest in real
property awarded to a person in a divorce decree by a court." 18 Notably, no such
amendment was ever made to subsection (xiv) or (xv). Furthermore, the Debtor was not
an alternate payee on the Petition Date. The Court cannot expand the exemption statutes

14

15

16

17

18

White v. White, 2017 UT App. 140, ,r 24, 2017 Utah App. LEXIS 142 (citing Marion
Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,r 14,267 P.3d 853).
Tesla Motors UT, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm 'n, 2017 UT 18 at ,r 38, 398 P.3d 55 ("The
breadth and reach of our laws are measured by the words that were voted on by the
legislature and signed into law by the governor - not by the general function or
purpose we may ascribe to the law in retrospect. ... We may have a sense of the
motivating consideration or 'purpose' of a legislative enactment, but our sense of
purpose is not law; it is at most an aid in resolving ambiguities in the law.") (emphasis
in original); State v. Outzen, 2017 UT 30, if 12, 2017 Utah LEXIS 85 ("Because the
plain language of [the statute] is unambiguous, no other interpretive tools are needed,
and our task of statutory construction is ... at an end.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21, if 8, 70 P.3d 85 (the court will only "seek
guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations" if "we find
the provision ambiguous" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 45, ,r 22, 234 P.3d 1147, 1154.
See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-505(l)(b).
See Carlson v. Diaz (In re Carlson), 303 B.R. 478,486 (10th Cir. 2004); Utah Code
Ann.§ 78-23-3(l)(c)(iii)(l999); H.B. 69, 1999 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 1999).
5
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~

to apply to the Debtor's Property Settlement simply because the Debtor thinks they
<iili1

should apply. 19
III.

~

THE POLICY ARGUMENTS WEIGH IN FAVOR OF DENYING THE
DEBTOR'S CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION
Even if the plain language of the statute and the legislative history were

ambiguous, which it is not, the policy arguments weigh against the Debtor's claim of
exemption. The Debtor, although entitled to a "fresh start", is not entitled to a "free
pass."20 The Debtor fails to recognize that the exemption statutes are not simply for the
benefit of debtors, but to balance two competing policy interests, the needs of the debtors
and the rights of the creditors. 21 As the United States Supreme Court explained in Clark
v. Rameker, allowing debtors to protect funds held in certain retirement accounts helps
ensure that debtors are able to meet their basic needs during their retirement years, while

19

°

2

~

21

See generally, Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, ,r,r 27-28, 70 P.3d 78 (declining to
apply the dog bite statute to a cat bite absent legislative intent to do so).
Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014) ("the Bankruptcy Code's purposes of
preserving debtors' ability to meet their basic needs and ensuring that they have a
'fresh start,' [does not entitle the debtor to] a 'free pass'").
Tesla Motors UT Inc v. Utah Tax Comm 'n, 2017 UT 18, ,r 39 ("Hardly any statute is
enacted for only one purpose. Most all of our laws are aimed at balancing competing
purposes, not at advancing one at all costs."); Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, ,r 27, 266
P .3d 806 ("Legislation is rarely aimed at advancing a single objective at the expense
of all others."); Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ,r 23 n.6, 248 P.3d 465
("[M]ost statutes represent a compromise of purposes advanced by competing interest
groups, not an unmitigated attempt to stamp out a particular evil."); Gladwell v.
Reinhart (In re Reinhart), 2011 UT 77, ,r,r 14-15 ("We are mindful of the competing
policy interest that a debtor not use his retirement plan as a means of hiding assets
from creditors."); Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 772-73 (2010) ("Congress balanced
the difficult choices that exemption limits impose on debtors with the economic harm
that exemptions visit on creditors.").
6
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the legal limitations on such accounts ensure that debtors do not enjoy a cash windfall by
virtue of the exemption. 22
As the Debtor admits, an alternate payee is not subject to the same limitations on
liquidation that a participant is, and may liquidate the assets without triggering penalties

~

and fees. 23 Thus, similar to an inherited IRA, nothing about the legal characteristics of
the Debtor's interest in the Property Settlement "would prevent (or even discourage) the
individual from using the entire balance of the account on a vacation home or sports car
immediately after her bankruptcy proceedings are complete."24 As recognized by the
Supreme Court, "[a]llowing that kind of exemption would convert the Bankruptcy Code's

~

purposes of preserving the debtors' ability to meet their basic needs and ensuring that
they have a 'fresh start,' into a 'free pass. '"25
The Debtor claims that the Trustee seeks a "windfall" and to make the Debtor a
"public charge. " 26 These allegations are without factual or legal support. The Trustee
seeks only to fulfill her duties to collect and distribute assets of the Debtor for the benefit
of creditors of the bankruptcy estate, as required by the Bankruptcy Code. 27 Conversely,
the Debtor seeks to discharge the totality of her debts while retaining the entire amount of
the Property Settlement to the detriment of all creditors.

22

23
24

25
26
27

Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. at 224 7.
Debtor's Brief, 14.
Clark v. Rameker, 134 S.Ct. at 2248.
Id.
Debtor's brief, 2, 22.
See 11 U.S.C. § 704.

Qh;

7
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vP
IV.

THERE IS NO "STATUS QUO" EXEMPTION IN THE PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT
The Debtor repeatedly argues that the Court must rule in her favor to avoid

disrupting the "status quo." Black's law dictionary defines status quo as: "the existing
~

state of things at any given date." 28 It is unclear why the Debtor believes the Property
Settlement is exempt under the "status quo." It appears that the Debtor is arguing either
( 1) that she can claim the Property Settlement is exempt because her former spouse could
have claimed his interest in his 40 I (k) exempt; or (2) that the interpretation of the statute
by certain practitioners creates a status quo. Both of these arguments are unavailing.
A.

The Ability of the Debtor's Former Spouse to Exempt His Interest In
the 40l(k) Does Not Create a "Status Quo" Exemption as to the
Debtor's Interest In the Property Settlement

To the extent the Debtor claims that she is entitled to an exemption in the Property
Settlement because her former spouse could have claimed an exemption in his 40 I (k),
such argument is without merit. Funds in the hands of one person are not necessarily
exempt in the hands of another. 29 Moreover, the Debtor's argument that the Property
Settlement is exempt solely because it involves distribution of funds that would be
@>

exempt in the hands of her former-spouse is incorrect and illogical. 30 The exemption
statutes apply to the Debtor's interest in property, not her former spouse's interest in

28

29
30

~

Status Quo, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Clark v. Rameker, 134 S.Ct. at 2248.
Id., at 2248 ("Under petitioners' contrary logic, if an individual withdraws money
from a traditional IRA and gives it to a friend who then deposits into a checking
account, that money should forever be deemed 'retirement funds' because it was
originally set aside for retirement. That is plainly incorrect.").
8
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property.
B.

The "Status Quo" of the Exemption Statute Excludes the Debtor's
Interest in the Property Settlement

The Debtor has cited to no case law, and the Trustee has found none, that supports
the Debtor's allegation that "divorce practitioners and bankruptcy practitioners", 31 and
indeed, "the entire country"32 understand, know, or believe that the Debtor's interest in
the Property Settlement is exempt. Indeed, even if the Debtor could show that certain
practitioners (or the entire country) believed that subsection (xiv) or subsection (xv)
should apply to the Property Settlement, such a belief could not create a "status quo" in
direct conflict with the plain language of the statute. To the extent a "status quo" exists,
it consists solely of the plain language of the exemption statute, which does not recognize
an exemption in the Property Settlement.
CONCLUSION

The Debtor's interest in the Property Settlement became property of the
bankruptcy estate on the Petition Date. Under the plain language of the Utah exemption
statutes, and relevant case law, that property interest is not exempt and therefore cannot
be removed from the Debtor's bankruptcy estate.

31

32

Debtor's Brief, 12 ("This reading of the applicable statutes is how current divorce
attorneys and debtors' attorneys have read the Act for decades."); Id. at 15 ("This
holding would memorialize the current status quo understanding of the law amongst
divorce practitioners and bankruptcy practitioners ... ").
Debtor's Brief, 22 ("The converse, argued by the trustee, leads to an absurd reading of
the Utah Exemption Act making what the entire country knows are unassailable assets
to creditors assailable simply because two people got divorced.").
9
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Dated this 15th day of November, 2017.
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
\\)

M
homson
Megan K. Baker
Attorneys for Trustee and Appellee

~
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